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As Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma successively lashed the Gulf Coast starting in late August 2005,
nature’s fury exposed serious weaknesses in the United States’s emergency response capabilities. These
problems were not simply the failure of particular places or leaders to be ready for disaster but rather an
indication of more fundamental issues. These must be addressed if the country is to be ready for serious
challenges that may lay ahead, whether severe natural disasters, outbreaks of emergent infectious dis-
ease, or renewed terrorist attacks.
Not all emergencies pose this magnitude of challenge. In the United States, the initial—and usually
major—responsibility for disaster response rests with local authorities. This “bottom-up” system of emer-
gency management has a long history and continues to make sense in most circumstances. Because local
governments are proximate to disaster sites and have at least some emergency capacity, they can respond
quickly to initial alerts. They have detailed knowledge of local conditions, and in many cases have agree-
ments for mutual aid to secure additional help rapidly from nearby jurisdictions. 
Aid from state or national sources is provided mainly when local capability is inadequate or has been
exhausted. State government may have important specialized resources and capabilities, but—farther
away—it is usually less able to respond immediately. Its resources may have to travel considerable dis-
tance to get to a disaster site. Federal government responders are likely to be even more distant—hence
much slower to arrive on a significant scale—and lack both local knowledge and integration with local
and state responders. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with relatively few deploy-
able staff, has historically played a much larger role in preevent planning and postevent recovery than in
the management of a disaster in progress. Other federal agencies have more operational resources but
are generally deployed as backup. Notwithstanding the reorganization of emergency response at the fed-
eral level as a consequence of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the “bottom-
up” system remains the “normal” model of disaster response.
Quite clearly, however, the normal model was inadequate to handle the results of Katrina—and showed
weakness in managing the fierce but less demanding challenges of Rita and Wilma. Commentators have
cited many reasons for this problematic performance. Some have pointed to decisions made decades ago:
to build a city in harm’s way and fail to upgrade and sustain investments in protective infrastructure.
Others decry the quality of advance preparation: inadequate emergency plans, insufficient training of
responders, poor follow-up to shortcomings revealed by tabletop exercises, and failure to build opera-
tional systems to coordinate agencies, jurisdictions, and levels of government. Still other criticisms relate
to actions just before or in the moment of crisis: weak leadership by elected executives, unqualified cri-
sis managers in charge, failure promptly to mobilize responders or commence evacuation, failure by
response organizations to perform effectively. Commentators also point to the contemporary context of
national preparedness: overemphasis on terrorism rather than all hazards emergency management, as
well as organizational subordination of FEMA inside the new Department of Homeland Security.
Although each of these explanations has some merit, in looking closely at emergency response, we see
an overarching failure to recognize and prepare for the imperatives of a major disaster. If the United
States doesn’t specify the strategic problems properly, efforts to reform the emergency response system
are likely to fall short in the next situation that strains the normal model. We see a number of core chal-
lenges to which disaster preparedness must accord careful attention.
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CORE CHALLENGES FOR LARGE-SCALE DISASTER RESPONSE
Recognizing Novelty and Effectively Improvising Necessary Responses
Katrina was not just “another” hurricane. Emergency responders ready themselves for a wide range of
urgent circumstances, including hurricanes. These involve high stakes, danger, and outcomes that are
critically contingent on responders’ own effective action. Though quite demanding, many of these situa-
tions can be regarded as “routine” emergencies—not because they are in some sense “easy” but because
the predictability of the general type of situation permits agencies to prepare in advance and take advan-
tage of lessons from prior experience. Such anticipatable events are “routine” emergencies for both the
agencies and individuals concerned. Response organizations develop contingency plans, train personnel,
practice their skills, and ready or stockpile necessary resources. In a fast moving routine emergency, indi-
vidual responders rely on near instantaneous recognition of complex patterns to size up cause and effect
and trigger swift implementation of the appropriate protective measures. When forecasters predict that
hurricane winds will make land fall, emergency organizations launch a range of programmed actions to
protect property, provide temporary shelter and supplies, make rescues as needed, and provide emer-
gency medical care and other assistance. 
The capacity to treat a wide range of contingencies, including quite severe ones, as “routine” constitutes
an enormous source of strength for emergency response personnel and organizations. They have thought
through how to act. They are equipped. They have trained and practiced. Their leaders’ judgment has
been honed by experience. In moments when delay may literally make a difference of life or death, they
don’t need to size up the situation for an extended period, plan their response from scratch, assemble
people and resources, and divide up roles and responsibilities. Responders are “ready” in multiple dimen-
sions of the term. But not all emergencies fit the mold.
“Crises” like Katrina are distinguished from more common
(though possibly very severe) routine emergencies by significant
elements of novelty. These novel features may result from
threats never before encountered (e.g., an earthquake in an area
that has not experienced one in recent memory or an emergent
infectious disease like SARS or avian flu); or from a more famil-
iar event occurring at an unprecedented scale, outstripping avail-
able resources; or from a confluence of forces, which, though not
new, in combination pose unique challenges. Katrina was a cri-
sis primarily because of its scale and the mixture of challenges
that it posed, not least the failure of the levees in New Orleans.
Because of the novelty of a crisis, predetermined emergency
plans and response behavior that may function quite well in deal-
ing with routine emergencies are frequently grossly inadequate or even counterproductive. That proved
true in New Orleans, for example, in terms of evacuation planning, law enforcement, rescue activities,
sheltering, and provisions for the elderly and infirm.
By contrast with “routine” emergencies, therefore, “crises” require quite different capabilities. In crises,
responders must first quickly diagnose the elements of novelty (e.g., in New Orleans, the widespread need
for assisted evacuation, the likely consequences when the levees failed, and the unexpected use of the con-
vention center for sheltering immobile refugees). Then they need to improvise response measures 
adequate to cope with the unanticipated dimensions of the emergency (e.g., quickly procuring vehicles for
“Because of the novelty of a crisis, 
predetermined emergency plans 
and response behavior that may 
function quite well in dealing with 
routine emergencies are frequently
grossly inadequate or even 
counterproductive.”
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evacuation, making emergency repairs to the levees, and providing food and law and order in an unpre-
pared shelter). These measures, born of necessity, may be quite different from or exceed in scale anything
responders have done before. They must be creative and extremely adaptable to execute improvised tac-
tics. Equipping organizations to recognize the novelty in a crisis and improvise skillfully is thus a far dif-
ferent (and far more difficult) matter from preparing mainly to implement preset emergency plans.
Scalability and Surge Capacity
In many disasters, as Katrina well illustrated, responders must cope with far greater numbers of endan-
gered people or more extensive damage than typical of a routine emergency. Crisis impacts may occur
very intensively in a delimited area or be spread across a wide geographic region. To scale up operations
to handle this surge of demand, emergency agencies require access to resources in larger quantities than
normal and frequently to specialized equipment or personnel. If an emergency lasts for days or weeks,
there must be enough people and resources to cope with exhaustion. 
No local jurisdiction—or even state—could bear the expense of keeping these assets in reserve for a large-
scale disaster that might never occur there. When such an event strikes, therefore, it is virtually inevitable
that the jurisdictions affected will have to import and effectively absorb support from surrounding areas
or—in very severe circumstances such as Katrina—from around the nation. 
In firefighting, most jurisdictions already have mutual aid agreements with neighboring communities
that enable any of them to expand available manpower and equipment. In case of a major fire, each com-
munity can draw on its neighbors’ resources; so no community has to invest in firefighting capacity suf-
ficient to counter a worst-case scenario. Highly specialized resources may be maintained on a regional or
state basis. Mutual aid agreements are regularly invoked, and firefighters from different locales both exer-
cise together and gain experience in confronting real fires. 
As Katrina revealed, however, it is a far more complex matter to address the need for reserve or “surge”
capacity in largescale disasters, in which many kinds of emergency response functions, equipment, and
personnel must be mobilized. There are political dimensions to the problem as well. By definition, surge
capacity is likely to be unused most of the time. Difficult tradeoffs must be made between local (and thus
more rapid) availability of resources and the high costs of sustaining them when no emergency is visible
on the horizon. What some see as a “strategic reserve,” others regard as “waste.” Maintaining sufficient
capacity to respond to large-scale disasters requires maintaining political support for emergency pre-
paredness budgets, notwithstanding competing, often compelling demands for funds from stakeholders
concerned with quite different issues. In the American federal system, moreover, debate about how much
responsibility and burden should be assumed by each level of government is also likely to be endemic.
The sudden need for many vehicles to evacuate autoless, elderly, or handicapped people from New
Orleans indicates the critical need for the right kind of resources, in sufficient amount, to be available in
timely fashion. Some of these resources can be provided for in advance. Improved plans can and should
be put in place to provide surge capacity for transport, food and water, medical facilities, and personnel.
The task requires careful advance assessment of potential needs, detailed logistical planning for trans-
porting resources to disaster sites (or people away from disasters to shelter and care), and procedures for
operational integration of personnel and materiel from many sources. Given the cost of acquiring and
maintaining this capacity, different levels of government must work out in advance how the emergency
plans of each align to provide for sudden surges in demand for response and relief capacity. In effect, they
will be moving a potential element of crisis “novelty” into the realm of “routine” preparedness. 
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Whether or not the emergency plans of local, state, or federal response agencies are adequate for even
severe routine emergencies, however, the novel circumstances of a crisis may also generate unexpected
demands for resources (or predictable demands for which supply remains inadequate) for which impro-
vised scale-up is essential. That involves a further set of considerations.
Maintaining Situational Awareness
In any crisis, responders (both individuals and organizations) must maintain “situational awareness.”
That is, they need to gather and assimilate key facts—often under conditions of great confusion and
uncertainty—and assess how they are positioned to deal with the emergency. The response to Katrina
reflects numerous examples of situational unawareness: failure to expedite the evacuation of New
Orleans sufficiently in advance of the storm, failure to anticipate the substantial number of individuals
who could not self-evacuate because they lacked cars and access to transit or were confused or too phys-
ically infirm to manage, slow or inadequate response to the breach of the levees, and lack of awareness
of the conditions faced by people sheltered in the New Orleans Convention Center.
Press and official comment has focused on whether or not key officials received or reached out for time-
ly and sufficient information about these conditions. Who knew what—and when—about the developing
crisis? As important as good intelligence about an emergency is, however, robust situational awareness
involves far more. Decision makers must also be able to project forward the implications of the informa-
tion they have gathered, so they can anticipate the likely consequences of a stillmoving situation. With
anticipation comes at least some possibility of changing the future before it arrives. Projecting likely con-
sequences also provides responders with a way of tracking what actually results against what they expect-
ed, thus providing a check on how well they understand what is truly happening. Finally, situational
awareness involves being able to generate possible alternative courses of action and assess which holds
the most promise of dealing with emergency conditions. 
As more accounts of decision making during Katrina become part of the public record, it becomes appar-
ent that major shortcomings of situational awareness resulted less because information about conditions
was unavailable or that it did not reach senior officials. Instead, leaders failed to project the likely conse-
quences of the developing situation or generate feasible measures to counter the impacts of the storm
and levee failure—thus falling short in different dimensions of situational awareness.
Integrated Execution in Real Time
In a major disaster, as local agencies confront extraordinary operational demands, emergency responders
from adjoining jurisdictions, the state, and farflung locations are likely to converge on the scene. Many will
be self-dispatched rather than answering requests for assistance. Not only must they perform useful tasks
themselves, they must also collaborate to ensure effectiveness and avoid interference, conflict, or endan-
germent of others. This demands skillful coordination of aid workers, equipment, and organizations across
professions, agencies, jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public and private sectors—even though
many of these people and organizations have had little or no prior experience working together.
This need has been recognized by Congress in the 2002 statutory requirement for a National Incident
Management System (NIMS), a flexible template for leading crisis operations which enables organiza-
tions to frame and rapidly implement response actions under enormous pressure. The underlying model
for NIMS (called the Incident Command or Incident Management System, ICS or IMS) was initially
devised 35 years ago in California to fight wildland fires and has since spread to many other states and
some other emergency professions. In response to the Congressional requirement, the Department of
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Homeland Security has initiated a staged deployment of NIMS, aiming at full utilization by all emergency
response organizations, across professional disciplines and levels of government.
IMS has important strengths in organizing emergency response. It factors critical emergency tasks, estab-
lishing a clear division of labor and assignment of functional responsibility. It unambiguously defines the
chain-of-command, provides a manageable span of control for each function, and establishes a resource
allocation decision-making structure—critically important to avoid dispute about “who’s in charge” and to
enable rapid deployment and direction of personnel and equipment. It systematically promotes informa-
tion flows up, down, and across the organization—and to the public. As a result, IMS is highly flexible in
response to incident type, scale, and location. It has been applied to wildland and urban fires, industrial
explosions, earthquake response, hospital emergency room operations, and hostage scenarios. 
However, as Katrina revealed, even basic diffusion of NIMS has not been completed in many jurisdictions
that have not previously used the system or to professional disciplines that have been unaware or unen-
thusiastic. Nor were the procedures for federal operations, on one hand, and intergovernmental collabo-
ration, on the other, that were nominally in place adequate or effectively applied to coordinate federal
agencies with each other or with state and local responders. Conceptually, the NIMS model has not been
fully integrated in the National Response Plan with the structure of the Emergency Support Functions
that are the core organizing principle of federal participation in disaster response. These gaps in concep-
tion, adoption, and implementation must be addressed in expedited fashion if the potential benefits of
NIMS are to be realized.
Operational vs. Political Leadership
Widespread deployment and skillful use of NIMS is a necessary but not sufficient condition for integrat-
ed crisis response. IMS has proved a highly effective technical system when the goals to achieve are rel-
atively unambiguous. For example, in dealing with the typical urban structural fire—even a very severe
one—there is generally firm consensus on the priorities and constraints of action: save lives, protect prop-
erty, but don’t unduly risk the lives of responders. This agreement enables firefighting professionals, clear
about the ends they are seeking, to focus mainly on the means they will use. 
IMS functions best when it is directed at a well defined, reasonably consistent, or clearly prioritized set
of purposes. By contrast, where goals are unclear or in conflict—when difficult, controversial trade-offs
must be made—IMS lacks the political and moral authority to make the hard choices that present them-
selves. Even in the fire service, IMS has worked less well when there has been contention about either
the goals of response or priorities among several objectives. When a dozen major forest fires menaced
southern California in the autumn of 2003, the strategy developed by professional firefighting organiza-
tions was subjected to severe criticism by local, state, and federal elected officials who disagreed with both
the professionals and each other about the objectives and technical means of fighting the fires. There was
no adequate institutional forum in which these elected officials could engage the issues, with each other
and the firefighting professionals, so they could be resolved. The emergency response nearly faltered
because of this discord. 
If a pandemic flu, bio-terrorist attack, or nuclear plant disaster occurred, do the responders in command of
NIMS—whether police commanders, fire chiefs, or public health directors—have legitimate authority to
decide which areas should get resources and which not, perhaps even to make choices that in effect determine
who will live and who will die? Do they have the community standing and ability to mobilize public support
behind a difficult decision? Can they—should they—hold to their decisions if elected lead-ers challenge them? 
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We invest elected leaders with the authority to make key decisions about values and priorities for society
and to rally their communities behind their choices, much as President Bush and New York’s Mayor
Giuliani did in the 9/11 crisis. But in a future emergency that cuts across organizational, jurisdictional,
and level of government boundaries—particularly if government has been partially disabled by the crisis
as it was during and after Katrina—it may be unclear who has this authority and difficult to assemble
them in the heat of the moment. It is precisely for such complex situations that NIMS is designed, but
the model does not include an effective way to coordinate political leaders and operational commanders,
especially when multiple jurisdictions are involved.
So, as NIMS develops as an emergency response system, we must create parallel structures for making
critical decisions that the public will regard as legitimate and compelling. The temporary emergency
operations structure of NIMS must be paired with institutions that do have ready connections to key
stakeholders and legitimate decisionmaking authority. The United States has not yet confronted this
need, let alone fully thought it through and invented the emergency policy making institutions it
requires. That is a step that must still be taken.
Handoffs Across Boundaries
As action in a crisis scales up and becomes more complex, leadership or certain responsibilities may need
to be transferred from those initially in charge to others with different skills or broader authority and
resources. Yet frequently this evolution of crisis response produces substantial friction between organi-
zations or jurisdictions, even when emergency plans or statutes theoret-
ically provide for such transitions. During Katrina, these frictions
became readily apparent as the city and mayor clashed with the state and
governor, as both criticized the federal response, and, ultimately, as voic-
es in other agencies within the federal government criticized FEMA’s
performance in leading the federal response. 
The mere existence of laws, emergency plans, or NIMS does not ensure
that responsible officials will know or play their roles effectively or that
conflicts will not arise in interpreting the rules. In the midst of crisis, the
leaders of individual agencies or political jurisdictions may find it per-
sonally or politically difficult to recognize or acknowledge that exigent
events surpass their ability to cope with the crisis; they may, in fact, resist
turning full or partial responsibility over to others better situated to deal
with circumstances. 
While no advance preparation can fully mitigate such reactions, addressing the possibilities inherent in
disaster scenarios can reduce the chances of hesitation or paralysis in crisis. Institutionally, within juris-
dictions and across levels of government, senior officials should address the conditions and procedures
under which handoffs would be made. Key officials must also consider their personal as well as institu-
tional preparedness. Preparedness requires anticipation of the potential need for such handoffs and
readiness to make (or accept) transfers of responsibility when the initial allocation is unworkable in the
face of a particular disaster. Newly elected or appointed officials need to think through their substantive
functions and moral responsibilities as crisis leaders in advance, rather than addressing their obligations
for the first time in the midst of catastrophe.
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“In the midst of crisis, the 
leaders of individual agencies 
or political jurisdictions may 
find it personally or politically 
difficult to recognize or 
acknowledge that exigent 
events surpass their ability 
to cope with the crisis.”
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IMPROVING DISASTER RESPONSE
Katrina has shown that the United States has not progressed as far as some believed in building better
emergency response capacity in the aftermath of 9/11 and the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security. Addressing the core strategic problems identified above means moving forward
effectively in four realms: capabilities, structures and systems, people, and coordination. 
Capabilities. Successful disaster response critically depends on sufficient equipment, supplies, trans-
portation, and trained responders with the capacity to sustain themselves in the field for the necessary
length of time. Because many of these resources are expensive and unlikely to be used most of the time,
it would be highly inefficient to maintain them in every location where they might potentially be needed.
However, even though there are ways in which the quantity, quality, and types of resources available in
the United States for emergency response could be improved, lack of resources is not the principal con-
straint on more effective response. The main challenge, particularly to provide adequately for surge capacity,
lies in being able to locate, mobilize, and move resources swiftly–and to coordinate their use effectively
upon arrival at a disaster scene. 
Structures and Systems. Making the National Incident Management System truly operational at the local
and state levels, as well as clarifying and effectively integrating it with the National Response Plan at the
federal level, as discussed above, is a critical step. It is essential if the country is to develop scalable emer-
gency response capability that has the flexibility to respond to a wide range of potential threat types and
disasters. At all levels of government, moreover, it is important to develop enhanced mutual aid agree-
ments that authorize and make operational a wider range of cooperative arrangements between commu-
nities, states, and within regions for all emergency response functions. Both NIMS and mutual aid
agreements must not be mere “paper” arrangements, moreover, but “live” procedures against which per-
sonnel are trained, exercises are conducted, and routine implementation, to the greatest extent possible,
serves to test procedures operationally.
People. Both first responders and emergency managers throughout the emergency response system have
a general need for increased training and exercising, a need that has begun to be filled in the post-9/11
period but which requires strengthening and sustained commitment. Training and exercises need to be
conducted not only for traditional forms of emergencies but also for new contingencies, such as terrorism
and emergent infectious disease, that were not seriously on the preparedness agenda a few years ago.
This training must be regular and varied, to keep skills sharp and to prepare new members of these 
professions for the threats they may encounter. 
In addition, there is a need to develop a cadre of senior disaster managers—in cities, states, and at the
federal level—who develop proficiency and deep experience in managing emergencies. It is particularly
important that they get experience in dealing with situations that cut across emergency response profes-
sions, agencies, jurisdictions, and levels of government. Two significant things would be accomplished if
a cadre of emergency leaders were systematically trained and exposed to increasing levels of responsibil-
ity in emergency response. Individuals would become more skillful in handling severe challenges. Even
more important, the most able among them could be identified, promoted, and deployed to face the most
demanding circumstances of natural and technology disasters, emergent infectious disease, or terrorism
that the nation might encounter.
Coordination. Individual response organizations in many locales are fully capable of dealing with the rou-
tine emergencies that they most frequently faced. As Katrina demonstrated, however, crises demand levels
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of coordination of governmental and non-governmental resources, including many that are not part of
the normal configuration of emergency agencies, which the response system is not currently able to pro-
vide. The American federal system does not centralize command in the hands of a single entity. As a
result, crisis coordination inevitably depends heavily on voluntary collaboration across agencies, jurisdic-
tions, levels of governments, and between the public and private sectors.
One key is to develop an “infrastructure” of coordination in advance—by laying out ground rules, estab-
lishing protocols about how information will be shared and decisions made, promulgated, and imple-
mented. The NIMS system is an important step in that direction, as is the deepening web of mutual aid
agreements among jurisdictions. A second key is to make sure that the formal infrastructure is given life
by exercising it regularly—through simulated and real action—and by building personal relationships
among the people who will be involved. Both practice and relationship formation are crucial.
The task of collaboration, as argued above, has both a technical and political component—which neces-
sitates construction of an infrastructure of coordination along both dimensions. NIMS significantly
advances the technical coordination task, but it provides little structure for the political coordination func-
tion, which is likely to be at least equally important in crisis situations. That political infrastructure must
be developed within metropolitan areas, within and among states, and between states and the federal gov-
ernment—and leaders must not be satisfied with paper procedures that may fail in time of need because
of inexperience.
The tasks identified here face serious obstacles more complex than can be addressed here. These include
the division of authority in the American federal system of government, conflicting constellations of
stakeholders at different levels of government and within jurisdictions, “feast or famine” budgeting for
emergency preparedness, the independence or near autonomy of different functional or policy domains,
and insufficient integration of the private sector in the emergency response system. As the response to
Katrina revealed, however, the costs of failing to act in time are real and great.
Note
Brief parts of this paper were previously published in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1
(Winter 2006): 215-221; and in the Crisis/Response Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 40-42.

